Emerging India: A Farewell to Multilateralism?

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India’s rise constitutes one of the most fascinating and important stories of the past two decades, symbolizing, along with China, the fundamental shift of power towards Asia. Yet, while many acknowledge India’s newfound importance, the country remains one of the most misunderstood actors in the international community. During the Cold War, India was the only democratic regime that did not align with the West. After turning into a nuclear power in 1998, the country suffered international condemnation, only to become one of the USA’s strategic partners less than ten years later - largely in the hope that it would balance China’s rise in the region.

India’s relationship to multilateral institutions is highly complex and, as this analysis seeks to show, its multilateral strategy is closely tied to its evolving identity and world view. Today, no global challenge - be it climate change, nuclear proliferation or poverty reduction - can be tackled successfully without India’s active contribution and engagement. Thus, the need to understand India’s perspective has never been greater.

The Indian Paradox

At first sight, there are many reasons to be optimistic about India: it boasts one of the world’s most dynamic economies, driven by a growing group of sophisticated entrepreneurs capable of competing globally. India has experienced unprecedented growth and stability since the end of the Cold War, and is expected to turn into one of the world’s five largest economies by the end of the decade. Given that the country finally seems to be capitalizing on its potential, several analysts have proclaimed the “Indian Century”, and the government is ever more confident in its claim for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, as well as more responsibility in institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

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At the same time, India is now the world’s largest arms importer, further boosting its international profile and potential role in security affairs in the Indian Ocean. Due to its democratic credentials, soft power, and reputation as a benign international actor, a consensus has emerged in the West that India is the world’s best hope to balance a rising China, both in the region and, at a later stage, in global affairs. Reflecting this, the USA’s recognition of India as a nuclear power - a move that risked weakening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - was unprecedented, and showed how important India has become.

However, India’s global aspirations are starkly contrasted by the enormous difficulties it faces both at home and abroad, severely restricting its foreign policy choices. With over 300 million Indians living below the poverty line and growing economic inequalities, India’s rise has yet to translate into tangible benefits for the poor, most of whom live in rural areas. The Maoist Naxalite insurgency, affecting large swathes of the country, has rightly been identified by the government as the India’s most serious security concern, sapping the government’s authority to take the country forward. Yet, the insurgents’ continued presence can be explained precisely because growth has not been sufficiently distributive. These issues have immediate relevance for Indian multilateralism: widespread rural poverty is, until today, a determining factor in India’s negotiation strategy in international institutions such as the WTO, or during climate talks.

More importantly for India’s foreign policy, Kashmir represents a bleeding wound that significantly diverts the attention of foreign policy makers, reducing their capacity to focus on other urgent challenges. Also, it reduces the ability of India’s armed forces to deal with regional security challenges more effectively, given that many are stationed along its disputed borders. Recent analyses have laid bare dysfunctions of New Delhi’s national security machinery (in which decision makers spend more time on internal procurement processes and battling bureaucracy than on developing foreign policy strategies)\(^1\), reducing India’s capacity to pursue its strategic objectives effectively. A political deadlock, a historic protest movement in the recent past (led by Anna Hazare), and a severe leadership crisis in the government further complicate its attempts to strengthen India’s role in the world.

How do these contrasting identities between ‘emerging power’ and ‘developing country’ affect India’s strategy vis-à-vis international institutions? Why has India been such a fervent proponent of multilateralism early on? Has India’s stake in multilateralism diminished as India’s stature has grown, thus fulfilling expectations of realist observers who argue that only weak powers...
support multilateral outfits?

Seeking to answer these questions, this article provides a historic overview of the evolution of Indian multilateralism, focusing on several episodes that reflect India’s overall strategy: India’s early engagement in peacekeeping, Kashmir and the UN, the breakup of Pakistan, India’s decision to test nuclear weapons, India’s intervention in Sri Lanka, India and the UN Security Council, and the US-Indian nuclear deal. It then describes the country’s motivations, and analyses the drivers that will influence India’s multilateral strategy over the next decade, arguing that its support for multilateralism may indeed weaken as it becomes one of the world’s leading economies.

Early multilateral Strategies and First Disappointments with Multilateralism

India became a firm supporter of the multilateral system even before gaining independence. While still a British colony, India became a member of the League of Nations and, upon the establishment of the UN system, Nehru’s foreign policy pronouncements continuously referred to the philosophy embodied in the UN Charter. This can be explained by the alignment of ideas visible in the UN and India’s independence movement, and the early and pragmatic acknowledgement by its leaders that, given its internal weakness, international institutions would be India’s only strategy to project its power and defend its interests. Yet, more than just acting out of weakness, India was also driven by a profound aversion to limiting its newfound independence, which can explain New Delhi’s reluctance to enter any former alliances. As the Cold War was fundamentally marked by such powerful alliances, there was little comprehension (particularly in the West), when India pursued non-alignment—the only logical solution to its conundrum.

Yet, India’s desire to strengthen international institutions can also be traced back to its identity. Engelmeier argues that India’s foreign policy was, particularly after Independence, an integral part of the country’s nation-building project. Contrary to other nations which took the simpler way of building a national identity around visible characteristics such as race, religion or language, India’s founding fathers pursued ‘value-based nationalism’ - more abstract and less discernible at first, but ultimately a pragmatic way to creating a nation of unparalleled cultural diversity. International institutions (which largely consisted of the UN system shortly after World War II), were constructed around a set of values, and espousing and supporting these institutions was thought to help articulate India’s national project and construction of a national identity.
India’s active engagement in peacekeeping activities reflects this particularly well. Shortly after the creation of the United Nations, India already played an important role in the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), which sought to reunite Korea, and organize general elections. Negotiations failed, and war between North and South Korea began in 1950; but the Indian government remained engaged, and was instrumental in the creation of a Neutral Nations Repatriations Commission, which India led to oversee the repatriation of prisoners of war between 1953 and 1954. This caused US President Eisenhower to express his admiration for the Indian troops responsible for the repatriation, at a time when the ideological schism between the USA and India had already occurred. As Bullion argues, “the Indian role in Korea can be regarded as instrumental in establishing the precedents for its participation in subsequent UN operations.” In 1956, India sent troops to the Middle East as part of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. The operation was largely seen as a success; it served as a model for future peacekeeping operations, and is said to have contributed to the UN Security Council’s swift decision to send peacekeepers to its next deployment in the Congo, which had a strong Indian participation.

Given the reasons cited above, India focused on multilateral processes even in moments when most other countries would have opted for bilateral or unilateral moves. In late 1947, India’s troops could have unilaterally driven back the advancing Pakistani army to consolidate its control over Kashmir. Yet, Nehru decided to refer the matter to the UN, which promptly insisted on a plebiscite to determine the future of the princely state - a recommendation India later rejected.

This episode is not India’s last negative experience on the multilateral level. In 1962, China invaded India after an escalation of the border dispute; but the majority of members of the non-aligned movement declined to follow Nehru’s call to condemn China. Two years later, China conducted its first nuclear test; and, in 1965, India and Pakistan fought a brief war in which many members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) supported Pakistan.

**Unilateralism in 1971**

Yet, India’s preference for multilateralism was tested in 1971, when the Pakistani army violently suppressed an uprising in East Pakistan, and millions of Bengali refugees flooded into India, Indira Gandhi - after appealing to the international community in vain - decided to pursue unilateral military action to help Bangladesh achieve its independence. While India effectively ended
massive ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Pakistani military against Bengalis and Hindu minorities in East Pakistan, it was severely criticized for this move in the international community. Only the Soviet veto in the United Nations Security Council prevented an official condemnation by the UN.

Justified or not, India’s move symbolized a significant break in India’s multilateral tradition. India was not even able to build a “coalition of the willing” (which was created for the purpose of other wars, such NATO’s war in Yugoslavia in 1999 or the US invasion of Iraq in 2003). In 1971, the notion among Indian foreign policy makers was that in a world of self-interested and opportunistic actors, multilateralism clearly had its limits. While India’s rhetoric remained pro-multilateral (and largely remains so until this day), there was an implicit consensus that India needed to garner the internal strength that would allow it to take unilateral action if necessary. While Nehru had already come to this conclusion towards the end of his tenure as Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister) after China’s 1962 invasion, he mostly remained a disillusioned idealist. His daughter Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, who had witnessed her father’s disappointments, assumed power as a pragmatic realist.10

First Nuclear Test: 1974

Nothing made this clearer than Indira Gandhi’s decision, in 1974, to test nuclear weapons in a “peaceful explosion”. This move pushed India further into isolation, and symbolized the high point of its frustration with multilateral institutions. 11 At the same time, even Indira Gandhi’s instinct to pursue a more realist strategy was mitigated, at least rhetorically. Curiously, India did not openly assume nuclear status after the tests. Several historic issues leading up to India’s decision to conduct the Pokhran I nuclear tests in 1974 need to be taken into account. India was sceptical of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the treaty’s inception, and has always refused to consider signing it, continuously arguing that the NPT was unjust and cemented ‘nuclear colonialism.’12 The NPT, thus, ascribed the role of ‘second-tier player’ to India.

In addition, India was arguably the country most affected by the NPT because it was the only large country that had no nuclear power ally to provide it with a nuclear security umbrella. As Nayar and Paul write, Indians were “simply left to fend for themselves.”13 The first opinion polls—conducted in 1972 after the creation of the NPT—showed that the majority of India’s elites were against the development of the bomb. The pro-bomb faction was small; but their support for the bomb was stronger than the sceptic’s rejection.
While right-wing parties were more in favour of the bomb, socialists, communists, and the Congress Party were split on the issue. However, 82 per cent of respondents of the study opposed signing the NPT, as it would severely limit India’s options to develop a bomb if the necessity arose - an important topic after the war against China in 1962 and against Pakistan in 1965. In addition, rejecting the treaty would allow Indians to keep foreign inspectors out of its nuclear sites, important for a country that despises foreign meddling after centuries of foreign occupation. Thirdly, the rejection can be explained by the “discriminatory conditions favouring the nuclear powers”, which have failed to honour their promise and disarm.

As Pran Chopra argued, the rationale was no different from other countries who had decided to go nuclear. Russia went nuclear because America did; China went nuclear because Russia did; and India went nuclear because China did - and because it suspected Pakistan was about to go nuclear as well, which would make India the only country “sandwiched” between two nuclear powers. Thus, with three nuclear powers having neighbouring borders with the other two, Asia came to have the highest concentration of nuclear arms, and thus came to pose the highest risk of nuclear war. India’s test would have probably taken place much earlier had India’s chief scientist, Homi Bhabha, not died in 1966, significantly delaying the project.

Yet, Chopra overlooks that India’s strategy - seemingly entirely motivated by realist reasoning - differed in many aspects from that of the other nuclear powers. The government’s unusual insistence that, despite the tests, India had no intention of producing nuclear arms, caused confusion and uncertainty about whether India had joined the nuclear club. As Engelmeier writes, “the recurring linkage between nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, the idea of advancing a nuclear-free world by way of becoming a nuclear power”, and controversial euphemisms such as “peaceful nuclear explosion” hint to an unusually intense debate about the moral implications of obtaining nuclear status and of potentially weakening the multilateral regime - something few other countries cared about.

### India’s ‘Intervention’ in Sri Lanka

India’s ‘intervention’ in Sri Lanka in 1987 neatly shows once more the limits of India’s will to follow the multilateral path. While the commitment to multilateralism and the consent of the host government to receive peacekeeping missions has always been an important requisite for the Indian government, India decided to send a peacekeeping force outside of the UN framework, an
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experience which significantly shaped India’s views of peacekeeping and unilateral action in general. With the number of Sri Lankan refugees increasing in India, Rajiv Gandhi sent the Indian Army to police a peacekeeping deal the India was instrumental. Originally sent to Sri Lanka as a neutral body with a mission to ensure compliance with the accord, the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) was pulled into the conflict, and was caught between an insurgency on one side and an unhelpful host Sri Lankan government on the other. India’s campaign of peace enforcement was a chastening experience. In the conflict that some called as “India’s Vietnam”, over 1,000 Indian soldiers died. In July 1989, the IPKF started a phased withdrawal of its remaining 45,000 troops, a process that took until March 1990 to complete. The lessons learned are visible until today: India is uneasy with ‘peace enforcement’, a practice it had still called for in the 1960s in Central Africa. In addition, it reduced India’s appetite for unilateral action on security matters. Contrasting the negative experience in Sri Lanka, India’s overall record of peacekeeping during the Cold War was exemplary, having participated in seven out of 13 missions.

Multilateralism after the Cold War


Also, India’s Lt. Gen S. Nambiar served as the first Force Commander and Head of Mission of UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia, from 1992 to 1993. This continued involvement clearly shows that, despite the trend that the United Nations increasingly often authorized the use of force to carry out its tasks, and despite India’s apparent unease with this trend, it did not reduce its peacekeeping engagement in any way. This is significant because it shows that while more coercive operations go against “the very roots of time-tested principles of consent, impartiality and a minimum use of force”, the UN seal of approval bestows, in India’s eyes, a sufficient level of legitimacy to such operations, and is still a far better alternative than interventions outside of the
Yet, the end of the Cold War also presented India with great challenges: its key supporter, the Soviet Union, disappeared, and a severe financial crisis forced the government to undertake unprecedented economic reforms. The crisis had two important effects on Indian multilateralism. First, India was forced to engage with the IMF and the World Bank to overcome the financial crisis, which inevitably drew it into the orbit of these institutions. Secondly, in the post-Cold War order, India urgently needed to diversify its partnerships as its position had become unsustainably isolated without its traditional backer. Indian policy makers identified international institutions as the best way to re-engage, and identify new partnerships across the world.

India and UN Security Council Reform

India had been a member of the League of Nations, and actively campaigned for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council during the San Francisco Conference in 1945. However, it ultimately failed, partly because it had not been an independent country at the time. This can also be explained by India’s leaders’ refusal to suspend its independence struggle, which caused Roosevelt to stop pressuring Great Britain to grant independence, driving a wedge between the US and India during the War. During the Cold War, India changed its approach, and lobbied towards making population a crucial indicator for the selection of non-permanent members and thus assure its frequent presence on the Council. It has been on the Council as a non-permanent member six times, making it one of the most frequent non-permanent members. As Blum points out, India has obtained, “quasi semi-permanent” status, although it has not been able to participate in the Council as often as Brazil, a country with comparable aspirations, due to its regional rivalry with Pakistan. In 2010, after Kazakhstan decided to give up a campaign it had been waging for years to obtain the Asian seat in the UNSC, India once more occupied the non-permanent seat, starting in January 2011.

The 1998 Nuclear Tests

In the 1990s, pressure increased on India to join the NPT. In 1992, the UN Security Council passed a resolution declaring that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a threat to international peace and security. This resolution, passed in the presence of India’s Prime Minister Rao, was directly aimed at India and significantly increased political pressure. India’s refusal to sign
the NPT caused many countries, most prominently the USA, to call India one of the most recalcitrant countries that contribute to the destruction of the global non-proliferation regime. Indians disagree; they call the regime flawed, and point to India’s continuous leadership in calling for bans on nuclear testing, for the establishment of a non-discriminatory treaty on non-proliferation, and complete elimination in 1988.

The 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT legitimized and perpetuated, in India’s eyes, an unequal nuclear regime. It constituted a turning point for India as it viewed the extension as a US attempt to foreclose India’s rise for good, and “defang it in the nuclear arena”. Later, in the same year, India came tantalizingly close to testing nuclear weapons openly. But the government pulled back at the last minute due to mounting international pressure.

Despite the pressure, India tested nuclear weapons for a second time (Pokhran II) in 1998, this time “crossing the nuclear Rubicon”, and fully assuming its nuclear weapons status, causing international condemnation and sanctions. Criticism was not only widespread abroad, but also at home, where several commentators argued that India had “lost moral stature and courage.” Yet, the tests also caused the USA to re-evaluate its relationship with India which, paradoxically, led to a strengthening of ties, and to the formulation of a strategic partnership only six years later. Many prominent Indian analysts, among them Raja Mohan, hailed the deal as a breakthrough, and argued that “thanks to the nuclear tests, India’s relationship with the United States stood transformed by the turn of the century. Although the United States did impose sanctions, it also began to treat India more seriously than ever before.”

The US–Indian Nuclear Deal: A Farewell to Multilateralism?

After laying the foundation for cooperation in many areas in 2004’s Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), the USA and India signed a wide-ranging cooperation agreement in 2005 covering many areas, including defence and technology cooperation. The most contentious part of the agreement was USA’s commitment to strengthen civil nuclear energy cooperation with India, effectively recognizing a nuclear weapons program of a country that had refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). After intense political debates in both countries regarding the details of the safeguards agreement, the IAEA approved the deal in mid-2008, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) accepted an India-specific waiver.
India had achieved the improbable: despite its refusal to accept a global treaty, it transformed itself from a pariah into an accepted partner - a triumph that reflected India’s newfound strategic weight. India was now strong and confident enough to ask for special treatment if it deemed necessary, even if that implied the potential weakening of multilateral agreements.

Outlook

Over the past decade, there have been growing attempts in the West to depict India as a spoiler on the multilateral level. Without doubt, India’s negotiating strategy has been controversial at times. After the breakdown of trade negotiations in Geneva in 2008, the Washington Post wrote:

India’s chief negotiator and commerce minister, Kamal Nath, may have played the biggest role in undoing the talks, repeatedly blocking attempts by developed nations to win greater access to India’s burgeoning market. Nath’s inflexibility was cheered as heroic in India, where his refusal to offer major concessions to rich nations was being portrayed as a classic David vs. Goliath case.41

Yet such claims overstate India’s controversial negotiation behaviour and omit significant successes. In many instances, it has proven to be a shrewd strategist. For example, India consistently voted with Washington against Iran’s program at the IAEA, while at the same time maintaining cordial ties with the regime in Tehran.42 As part of the BRICS outfit, it engages in a meaningful way, but cleverly allows Russia and China to spearhead the outfit’s more contentious plans - such as replacing the dollar as the world’s prime currency - in order not to compromise its ties to Washington. In a low-key manner, it firmly promotes the G4’s proposal for UN Security Council reform, while still holding an influential position among the G77 in the UN (although the latter one will be difficult to maintain as India turns into one of the world’s largest economies.) Finally, at the WTO, India is a member of the Five Interested Parties and the G-20, thus effectively straddling both worlds.43

It is important to keep this dual role in mind when making predictions about India’s future role in multilateral outfits. While the call for a more democratic and just world order still tinges India’s foreign policy rhetoric, there is a growing sense among poor developing countries that India no longer represents their interests. This has become clear in several instances. For example, during the WTO negotiations, India’s interests were clearly opposed to those of small developing countries. Similar reservations exist among small
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poor nations in the Climate Change negotiations. Nayar and Paul argue that “emotionally though not formally, India has…already left…the Non-Aligned Movement”, thus moving further away from the position of developing countries. Similarly, as Raja Mohan adds, “by the late 1990s, [India] was compelled to look for ways to ease out of the political straightjacket the NAM had become on its external relations.”

This matters for India’s multilateral strategy. While it has traditionally called for a more prominent position in institutions such as the UNSC in its role as ‘spokesperson of the poor’, yet already in 2005, the G4’s effort failed, among other reasons, because poor developing countries remained unconvinced that emerging powers such as Brazil and India would effectively represent their interests at the high table. Does India genuinely want to make the global order more legitimate and democratic? Or does it merely seek to join an extended oligarchy? Over the next years, India will face the stark choice of opting for either inclusive and more ineffective, or exclusive and more effective, outfits. It will be increasingly tempted to opt for the latter.

There is growing evidence to support the claim that, as India grows more powerful, it is keener to work bilaterally, or in small, at times regional, groupings. The unexpected benefits that emerged from the bilateral relationship with the USA seem to have encouraged the Indian government to sign a strategic partnership with virtually all global actors. In response to the nuclear deal, Pratap Banu Mehta is worried about India becoming more like the USA as it emerges “unilateral, oriented towards hegemony more than the stability of the world”. Indeed, as India grows more powerful, it will increasingly be able to dictate terms in its bilateral relationships which are likely to be more beneficial to India.

In order to consistently seek the multilateral route, India would have to both learn to engage more effectively as also begin to develop a sense of ownership of the current system. The notion that India’s participation is crucial to shoulder global burdens may have been embraced by key decision makers. However, they have not communicated this notion effectively to society. This is necessary to reduce the risk of political backlash against complex multilateral agreements for which India needs to meet its counterparts half-way. In addition, the government is taking smaller outfits, such as IBSA, the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BASICS and the G4, very seriously. For example, IBSA is designed as a platform for dialogue; so it may help to jointly coordinate positions within larger negotiations (such as the WTO), rather than replacing institutions with a global reach.
In order to address India’s biggest weakness—its incapacity to exercise regional leadership—India will have to invest much more time and energy to strengthening regional bodies such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Far from articulating a clear and attractive vision for the region, India remains a reactive force that lacks initiative to propose bold projects such as, for example, the creation of a pan-South Asian energy grid. Despite a strong focus on Pakistan, India wields virtually no influence over the - admittedly unpredictable - government in Islamabad. Intra-regional trade remains minimal, and India’s attempts to push for greater economic integration have repeatedly been frustrated. This is surprising, as smaller neighbours such as Bangladesh could benefit enormously from integrating economically with India. Here, India still struggles to overcome the disruptive effects of Partition on the region - economic regions such as Kolkata-Bangladesh and Karachi–Mumbai were separated in 1947, and barriers between them remain formidable. There is now a growing consensus that India simply cannot leapfrog problems in its vicinity and onto the world stage. Given that several of its neighbours are frequently hostile towards India, a regional backlash in the region could seriously undercut India’s global strategy. As a consequence, regional outfits will inevitably be one of India’s foreign policy foci for years to come.

**Conclusion**

Despite India’s traditional focus on multilateralism and strong support for the United Nations during the Cold War, its performance on the multilateral level today is thought to be less effective than in the bilateral realm, where its performance has matured considerably. While India’s unusual pro-multilateral stance over the past 60 years can largely be understood in the context of the country’s national identity and an integral part of the India’s nation-building project, India’s growing power is now likely to reduce its interest in multilateral outfits.

Given India’s notable success over the past two decades, Indian foreign policy makers increasingly need to confront the question of whether and how their country will contribute to dealing with global challenges such as climate change, piracy, failed states and economic volatility. India’s growing might will fuel others’ expectation for India to engage in global burden sharing. Unless it is ready to do so, India may easily lose the support of developing countries that have long formed the core of India’s followership, as they no
longer see India defending their interests on the international level. Its constructive role in the G20 clearly shows that India does not have to be obstructionist. Instead of focusing on status, as it has often done in past decades, India’s foreign policy is likely to become more pragmatic. For example, rather than engaging in fixed partnerships, India will pursue its national interest in its growing sphere of influence, and align with whomever it deems convenient - be it other emerging countries such as Brazil in one moment, and the United States in the next.

Notes


7 Ibid.

8 Nambiar, n. 5.


10 In 1961, Nehru’s troops invaded Goa and expelled the Portuguese, a move many Western countries condemned, marking one of the few moments in which Nehru decided to act unilaterally.


14 Ashish Nandy, 1972, “The Bomb, the NPT and Indian Elites”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 7, no. 31/33, Special Number.

15 Ibid. See also, Vinaik, n 12, pp. 1825–1826.


17 Mohan, n. 11.


19 Engelmeier, n. 2.


24 Bulion, n. 6., pp. 98–114. See also, Nambiar, n. 5.

25 Unlike Great Britain’s other colonies, India had been given permission to join the League of Nations, Kulwant Rai Gupta, 2006, *Reform of the United Nations*, New Delhi, Atlantic Publishers.


28 Gupta, n. 25.


30 Ibid.


32 Mohan, n. 11.


35 Singh, ibid.
38 In the aftermath of the tests, the members of the UNSC, the G8, and the EU condemned India, and imposed economic sanctions. However, two years later, most sanctions had been reversed, and New Delhi stood in strategic dialogue with most major powers. Russia and France maintained strong ties with India, and avoided its complete isolation. See, Nayar and T.V. Paul, n. 13. Raja Mohan points out that, barely four months after the nuclear tests, India’s Prime Minister Vajpayee declared that India and the United States were ‘natural allies’ (Mohan, n 11.).
40 Mohan, n 11.
42 Malone, n. 9.
43 Ibid.
45 Mohan, n. 11.

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