

Global Nuclear Politics

(30h)

July 1 - July 4: 2pm - 6:30pm (Classroom 403)

July 5: 7:30am - 3pm (trip to CTMSP Aramar)

July 6: 9am - 1:30pm (Classroom 403)

Course Description

This course offers a short introduction to global nuclear politics. The syllabus offers a broad overview of the field, and seeks to acquaint students with the major debates of the day. The course is divided into five parts. First, a discussion of the revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons on world politics runs through issues of nuclear strategy, foreign policy, and nuclear proliferation. The second section introduces students to the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear propulsion and their effects over international security. Third, the course deals with the non-proliferation regime, and the institutions, norms, and practices of nuclear global governance. The fourth part of the course focuses on the diplomatic challenges of global nuclear order as they pertain to Iran and North Korea in particular, and non-proliferation and disarmament in general. The last section looks at Brazil's nuclear program in some detail.

Lectures and discussions will occur in both **English** and **Portuguese**. Students should be prepared to read and debate in both languages. As part of the course, students will visit the Brazilian Navy's installation in Iperó, São Paulo. FGV will provide transportation, leaving in the morning and returning mid-afternoon.

Participants on the course are required to attend at least **75%** of all lectures.

Reading Materials

Readings will be accessible through Dropbox.

Evaluation

This course consists of a series of classes with pre-assigned readings. Students are expected to do the mandatory readings before class. Final grades will be assigned as follows:

- Participation in class: 20%
- Final essay: 80%

Participation: Students are expected to engage the reading materials and discuss them in class.

Final essay: Each student will submit a 5-page essay. The essay must be sent to lucas.florentino@fgv.br no later than xxx. Papers received after the deadline will be dropped two full points in a 10-point scale. No essay will be accepted one week after the deadline. Essays may be submitted in English or Portuguese.

LECTURERS

Layla Dawood, State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) (Brazil)

Stephen Herzog, Yale University (US)

Togzhan Kassenova, State University of New York (US)

Federico Merke, Universidad de San Andrés (Argentina)

Matias Spektor, FGV School of International Relations (Brazil)

INVITED SPEAKERS

Sonia Fernández Moreno, Planning and Evaluation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)

Lucas Perez Florentino (TA), FGV School of International Relations

Guilherme Fasolin, FGV School of International Relations

Marcos Marzo, Secretary-General of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)

Marcelo Paz Saraiva Câmara, chief of the Division on Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil.

Brieuc Pont, Consul general of France in São Paulo

Laercio Antonio Vinhas, former Ambassador of Brazil to the International Atomic Energy Agency

Criteria for Marking the Essay

8 or above: Work in this category shows excellent command of the topic. It is well organized, clearly expressed and cogently argued. Work in this category will either approach the question from an unexpected angle, contain unusually illuminating or original thinking, or be especially well illustrated.

7,5 to 7,9: Work in this category shows excellent command of the topic. It is well organized, clearly expressed and cogently argued.

6,5 to 7,4: Work in this category shows sound knowledge of the topic. It displays very good understanding of the question and it is clearly organized and cogently argued. The argument is detailed, precise, and clear.

6 to 6,4: Work in this category shows sound knowledge of the topic. It is clearly organized and cogently argued. Achieving this mark on a question means that the student has firm control of the essential points.

5,5 to 5,9: Work in this category shows some weaknesses in terms of its accuracy, coherence, detail, organization, or focus.

5 to 5,4: Work in this category shows extensive weaknesses in terms of its accuracy, coherence, detail, organization, or focus. The candidate has firm control of at least some of the essential points.

4 to 4,9: Work in this category shows some basic knowledge of the topic. Yet it displays some serious deficiencies in terms of its accuracy, coherence, detail, organization, or focus.

3 to 3,9: Work in this range shows an attempt to answer the question set, but it is either irrelevant to the question set, incoherent, unsystematic, superficial, or unacceptably brief.

1 to 2,9: Work in this category fails to show any basic knowledge of the topic.

Zero: Work that features evidence of plagiarism

Course Policies:

- Minimum attendance 75%;
- Cell phones must be turned off during class;
- Electronic devices in the classroom serve the sole purpose of taking lecture notes;
- It is the policy of the School of International Relations at FGV that all cases of academic dishonesty – including plagiarism – be reported to the Undergraduate Committee and their Chair. A detailed discussion on plagiarism will take place in class before submission of the first essay.

Course Schedule

Welcome remarks (Matias Spektor)

Monday, July 1, 2pm-2:30pm

PART 1 – NUCLEAR ARTIFACTS AND TECHNOLOGY (1): NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Lecture 1: Nuclear Arms Race (Stephen Herzog)

Monday, Jul 1, 2pm-3:30pm

- Manhattan Project
- Building the bomb – basic nuclear weapons technology
- Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and nuclear weapons effects
- World War II aftermath and the Baruch Plan
- U.S.-Soviet arms race
- Nuclear triad
- Strategic versus tactical nuclear weapons
- Command and control

Nuclear Basics:

Wikipedia entry on "Nuclear weapon design": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon_design

Assigned readings:

GAVIN, F. *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012. [Introduction + chapter 1]

THAKUR, R. Introduction: The challenge of nuclear weapons. In: _____. *Nuclear Weapons and International Security: Collected Essays*. New York: Routledge, 2015, p.1-18.

Complementary readings:

ALPEROVITZ, G. Hiroshima: Historians Reassess. *Foreign Policy*, v.99, p.15-34, 1995.

EDEN, L. City on fire. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, v.60, n.1, p.32-43, 2004.

FEAVER, P. D. Command and control in emerging nuclear nations. *International Security*, v.17, n.3, p.160-187, 1992.

FEAVER, P. D. *Guarding the guardians: Civilian control of nuclear weapons in the United States*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992.

SCHROEER, D. *Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Arms Race*. New York, N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1984. [Chapter 2: "The Fission Bomb" (pp. 14-57). Chapter 3: "The Fusion Bomb" (pp. 58-81)]

WILSON, W. The winning weapon? Rethinking nuclear weapons in light of Hiroshima. *International Security*, v.31, n.4, p.162-179, 2007.

Youtube Video "Cold War and Nuclear Arms Race": <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6hMQZAdcgl>

Lecture 2: Nuclear Proliferation and Strategy (Stephen Herzog)

Monday, Jul 1, 3:30pm-5pm

- Theories of Proliferation
- Potential rationales for nuclear use
- Use vs. non-use: balance of terror and nuclear taboo
- Counter-force versus counter-value targeting
- Massive retaliation versus flexible response
- First- and second-strike
- Deterrence and extended deterrence
- Credibility of deterrent strategies
- Missile Defense

Assigned readings:

SAGAN, S. D. Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb. *International Security*, v.21, n.3, p.54-56, 1996.

KRAUSE, K. Rationality and Deterrence in Theory and Practice. In: SNYDER, C.A. (Ed.) *Contemporary Security and Strategy*. London: Palgrave, 1999, p.120-149.

Recommended readings:

BLEEK, P. C.; LORBER, E.B. Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v.58, n.3, p.429-454, 2014.

FREEDMAN, L. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. London: MacMillan Press, 1981.

LEWIS, G. N.; POSTOL, T. A. The European missile defense folly. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, v.64, n.2, p.33-39, 2008.

LIEBER, K.; PRESS, D. The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence. *International Security*, v.41, n.4, p.9-49, 2017.

NARANG, N.; MEHTA, R. N. The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral hazard in a Nuclear Client State. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, p.1-33, 2017.

TANNENWALD, N. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use. *International Organization*, v.53, n.3, p.433-468, 1999.

WOHLSTETTER, A. The Delicate Balance of Terror. *Foreign Affairs*, v.37, n.2, p.211-234, 1959.

Complementary material:

Youtube Video "NATO ballistic missile defence overview": <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3LPdmxnBkIU>

Watch movie: "Dr. Strangelove or: How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb"

**PART 2 – NUCLEAR ARTIFACTS AND TECHNOLOGY (2):
WHAT IS NUCLEAR?**

Lecture 3: Nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear propelled-submarines (Lucas Perez Florentino)

Monday, Jul 1, 5pm-6:30pm

- Nuclear latency and nuclear threshold
- The nuclear fuel cycle: what is *nuclear* in the *nuclear* fuel cycle?
- Mining and nuclearity
- Enrichment, fissile materials (uranium and plutonium), reprocessing, and the global politics of non-proliferation
- Nuclear propelled-submarines: new dynamics in non-proliferation and international security?

Nuclear Basics:

CNEN. Programa de Integração CNEN - Módulo Informação Técnica, s.d.

<http://www.cnen.gov.br/images/cnen/documentos/educativo/programa-de-informacao-cnen.pdf>

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle. *World Nuclear Association*, 2017. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/nuclear-fuel-cycle-overview.aspx>

Uranium Enrichment. *World Nuclear Association*, 2019. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment.aspx>

Plutonium. *World Nuclear Association*, 2018. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/plutonium.aspx>

Assigned readings:

HECHT, G. The Power of Nuclear Things. *Technology & Culture*, v.51, n.1, p.1-30, 2010.

Recommended Readings:

BURKE, A. *Uranium*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017.

HYMANS, J. E. C. When does a state become a 'nuclear weapon state'? An Exercise in Measurement Validation. *Nonproliferation Review*, v.17, n.1, p.161-180, 2010.

MEHTA, R. N.; WHITLARK, R.E. The Benefits and Burdens of Nuclear Latency. *International Studies Quarterly*, v.61, p.517-528, 2017.

VON HIPPEL, F. Mitigating the Threat of Nuclear Proliferation from Nuclear-Submarine Programs. In: SQUASSONI, S. (Ed.) *Reducing Risks from Naval Nuclear Fuel*. Washington: The George Washington University, 2018, p.9-20.

**PART 3 – NUCLEAR POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE:
HOW TO MANAGE AND CONTROL NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGY?**

Lecture 4: Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament (Stephen Herzog)

Tuesday, Jul 2, 2 pm-3:30pm

- Potential rationales for arms control
- SALT I and II; ABM Treaty; INF Treaty
- START I and importance of verification
- Nuclear-weapon-free zones
- PTBT, TTBT, PNET, and CTBT and nuclear explosion monitoring

- Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Assigned readings:

HANSON, M. Normalizing zero nuclear weapons: The humanitarian road to the Prohibition Treaty. *Contemporary Security Policy*, v.39, n.3, p.464-486, 2018.

MAURER, J. D. The Purposes of Arms Control. *Texas National Security Review*, v.2, n.1, 2018.

Recommended readings:

BUKHARIN, O.; DOYLE, J. Transparency and Predictability Measures for U.S. and Russian Strategic Arms Reductions. *Nonproliferation review*, v.9, 82-100, 2002.

MACKBY, J. Still seeking, still fighting. *The Nonproliferation Review*, v.23, n.3-4, p.261-286, 2016.

WEBER, S. *Cooperation and discord in US-Soviet arms control*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991.

JERVIS, R. Cooperation under the security dilemma. *World Politics*, v.30, n.2, p.167-214, 1978.

Lecture 5: Nuclear technology control (Stephen Herzog)

Tuesday, Jul 2, 3:30pm-5pm

- NPT and IAEA safeguards
- New approaches for safeguards
- Safeguards and nuclear naval propulsion
- Nuclear Suppliers Group

Nuclear Basics:

ALGER, J. A Guide to Global Nuclear Governance: Safety, Security and Nonproliferation. *Nuclear Energy Futures*, special publication. The Center for International Governance Innovation, September 2008.

Assigned readings:

Text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/>

TAPE, J.; PILAT, J. Nuclear Safeguards and the Security of Nuclear Materials. In: DOYLE, J. (ed.) *Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy*. Oxford: Elsevier, 2008, p.17-30.

Recommended readings:

POPP, R.; HOROVITZ, L.; WENGER, A. (Eds.). *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order*. London: Taylor & Francis, 2016.

PHILIPPE, S. Safeguarding the Military Naval Nuclear Fuel Cycle. *Journal of Nuclear Materials Management*, v.42, n.3, p.40-51, 2014.

Complementary material:

Youtube video: "What is the NSG?" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UyMkA3R3zPE>

Special Guest Session: The International Atomic Energy Agency: an inside look (Laercio Vinhas)
Tuesday, Jul 2, 5pm-6:30pm

- The history and structure of the IAEA
- Board of Governors
- Nuclear safeguards
- Nuclear safety and security
- Nuclear technical cooperation

Nuclear Basics:

IAEA. IAEA Factsheet: Organization. Vienna: IAEA, 2018. Retrieved from: <<https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/08/the-iaea-policy-making-organs-providing-guidance-for-the-agencys-work.pdf>>

IAEA. IAEA Safeguards Serving Nuclear Non-proliferation. Vienna: IAEA, 2018. Retrieved from: <<https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/sg-serving-nuclear-non-proliferation.pdf>>

Assigned readings:

BROWN, R. Nuclear Authority, 1998-2013. In: _____. *Nuclear Authority: The IAEA and the Absolute Weapon*. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2015, p.140-180.

Recommended readings:

BOURESTON, J.; OGILVIE-WHITE, T. Expanding the IAEA's nuclear security mandate. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, v.66, n.5, p.55-64, 2010.

HECHT, G. Negotiating Global Nuclearities: Apartheid, Decolonization, and the Cold War in the Making of IAEA. *Osiris*, v.21, p.25-48, 2006.

FISCHER, D. Nuclear Safety and Management of Nuclear Waste. In: _____. *History of the IAEA: The First Forty Years*. Vienna: The International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997, p.183-242.

FISCHER, D. The Transfer of Nuclear Technology to the Developing World. In: _____. *History of the IAEA: The First Forty Years*. Vienna: The International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997, p.325-372.

FISCHER, D. Nuclear Safeguards: The First Steps. *IAEA Bulletin*, v.49, n.1, p.7-11, 2007.

ROEHLICH, E. The Cold War, the developing world, and the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1953-1957. *Cold War History*, v.16, n.2, p.195-212, 2016.

Complementary material:

The IAEA History Research Project - <https://iaea-history.univie.ac.at/>

PART 4 - DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES IN THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR ORDER

Lecture 6: Iranian Nuclear Program - From the Tehran Declaration to the JCPOA (Stephen Herzog, Matias Spektor, and Guilherme Fasolin)
Wednesday, Jul 2, 2pm-3pm

- An overview of the Iranian Nuclear Program
- Coercive diplomacy and hedging
- International negotiations

- The Tehran Declaration
- JCPOA and beyond

Assigned readings:

WALTZ, K. N. Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability. *Foreign Affairs*, 2012, p. 2-5.

KROENIG, M. Time to attack Iran: Why a strike is the least bad option. *Foreign Affairs*, 2012.

KAHL, C. H. Not time to attack Iran: Why war should be a last resort. *Foreign Affairs*, 2012.

Recommended readings:

Wikipedia article on "Nuclear program of Iran": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_program_of_Iran

PERKOVICH, G., HIBBS, M., ACTON, J. M.; DALTON, T. *Parsing the Iran Deal: An Analysis of the Iran Deal from a Nonproliferation Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015.

SAMORE, G. (Ed.). *The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide*. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, pp.1-17, 2015.

TABATABAI, A. Negotiating the "Iran talks" in Tehran: the Iranian drivers that shaped the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. *The Nonproliferation Review*, v.24, n.3-4, p.225-242, 2017.

Lecture 7 (Stephen Herzog) + Special Guest Session (Marco Marzo): North Korean Nuclear Program
Wednesday, Jul 3, 3pm-4:30pm

- An overview of the North Korean nuclear program
- Regional implications and survey experiment
- International negotiations
- Verifying test site closure
- **An inside look of IAEA's non-proliferation efforts in North Korea (Marco Marzo)**

Assigned readings:

"North Korea" overview by Nuclear Threat Initiative: <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/>

CHA, V. D.; KANG, D. C. *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. [Chapter 5 "Hyperbole Dominates: The 2003 Nuclear Crisis" (pp. 107-133).]

HERZOG, S. After the Summit: A Next Step for the United States and North Korea. *Arms Control Today*, v.48, n.6, p.6-11, 2018.

Recommended readings:

ALLISON, D. M.; HERZOG, S., KO, J. Preparing for the Unthinkable in East Asia: Cross-National Public Opinion on the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella, 2019 [Unpublished policy report].

DEBS, A; MONTEIRO, N. P. Cascading Chaos in Nuclear Northeast Asia. *The Washington Quarterly*, v.41, n.1, p.97-113, 2018.

LEWIS, J. *The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States: A Speculative Novel*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018

SIGAL, L. V. *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. [Chapter 4 "A Better than Ever Chance of Misestimation" (pp. 90-123)]

“Obstacles and dilemmas in the global nuclear governance” (provisional title) - A conversation with Brieuc Pont

Wednesday, Jul 3, 4:30pm-5:30pm

- TNP Three Pillars and NPT Rev Com.
- Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and disarmament
- North-South Divide
- TPNW, humanitarian path, and the road ahead

Assigned readings:

WHEELER, N.; RUZOCKA, J. The Puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs*, v.86, n.1, p.69-85, 2010.

Recommended readings:

BLUTH, C. The Irrelevance of ‘Trusting Relationships’ in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Reconsidering the Dynamics of Proliferation. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, v.14, p.115-130, 2012.

CRAIG, C. RUZICKA, J. The Nonproliferation complex. *Ethics & International Affairs*, v.27, n.3, p.329-348, 2013.

DALTON, T. HOFFMAN, W.; LEVITE, A.E.; BIN, L.; PERKOVICK, G. ZHAO, T. Toward A Nuclear Firewall: Bridging The NPT’s Three Pillars. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 2017.

DOYLE, J.; STEEPER, C. Steps toward increased nuclear transparency. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, v.68, n.2, p.55-62, 2012.

JASPER, U. Dysfunctional, but stable - a Bourdieuan reading of the global nuclear order. *Critical Studies on Security*, v.4, n.1, p.42-56, 2016.

PORTER, W. *Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement: Principles vs. Pragmatism*. London: Routledge, 2012.

PRETORIUS, J.; SAUER, T. The nuclear security discourse: Proliferation vs disarmament concerns. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, v.21, n.3, p.321-334, 2014.

Lecture 7: Social experiments and nuclear politics (Stephen Herzog)

Wednesday, July 3, 5:30pm-6:30pm

- Survey experiments in nuclear politics field

Assigned readings:

PRESS, D.; SAGAN, S. D.; VALENTINO, B.A. Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. *American Political Science Review*, v.107, n.1, p.188-206, 2013.

Recommended Readings

KO, J. Alliance and Public Preference for Nuclear Forbearance: Evidence from South Korea. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2018.

SAGAN, S. D.; VALENTINO, B. A. Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran. What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants. *International Security*, v.42, n.1, p.41-79, 2017.

PART 5 - NUCLEAR BRAZIL

Lecture 7: History of the Brazilian Nuclear Program (Matias Spektor)

Thursday, July 4, 2pm-3:30pm

- Initial motivations and intentions (1940-1970s)
- The Brazil-West Germany Agreement and its implications (1974-1979)
- The parallel program (1979-1989)
- Adhering to global nuclear regimes (1989-1998)
- Recent developments (1989-2010)

Assigned reading:

SPEKTOR, M. The evolution of Brazil's nuclear intentions. *Nonproliferation Review*, v.23, n.5, p.635-652, 2016.

Complementary reading:

ABRAHAM, I. The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories. *Osiris*, v.21, n.1, p.49-65-2006.

Lecture 8: Brazilian nuclear policy today (Lucas Perez Florentino) + Special Guest Session (Layla Dawood)

Thursday, July 4, 3:30pm-5:30pm

- Capabilities and actors
- **“The Brazilian Nuclear-propelled Submarine and Deterrence Theories” (Layla Dawood)**
- Governance and vulnerabilities
- Next decade

Assigned readings:

SPEKTOR, M.; KASSENOVA, T.; PEREZ FLORENTINO, L. *Prospects for Nuclear Governance in Brazil*, forthcoming.

HERZ, M.; DAWOOD, L.; LAGE, V.C. A Nuclear Submarine in the South Atlantic: The Framing of Threats and Deterrence. *Contexto Internacional*, v.39, n.2, p.329-350

Complementary readings:

HERZ, M.; DAWOOD, L.; LAGE, V.C. Brazilian nuclear policy during the Worker's Party Years. *Nonproliferation Review*, v.23, n.5-6, p.559-573, 2016.

KASSENOVA, T. *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014.

MARTINS FILHO, J. R. O Projeto do Submarino Nuclear Brasileiro. *Contexto Internacional*, v.33, n.2, p. 277-314, 2011.

Debate: “Argentina, Brazil, and ABACC in the next decade”: a conversation with Federico Merke, Marco Marzo, and Matias Spektor

Thursday, July 4, 5:30pm-6:30pm

Assigned readings:

KUTCHESFAHANI, S. Z. Who Shapes the Politics of the Bomb? The Role of Epistemic Communities in Creating Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies. *LSE Global Governance Working Papers*, n.3, 2010.

MERKE, F. Argentina in a Changing Nuclear Order: An Appraisal. In: DALTON, T.; KASSENOVA, T. (Eds.)

Perspectives on the Evolving Nuclear Order. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Security, 2016, p.15-24.

QUEIROZ, J. M. G. de. ABACC: os primeiros 25 anos. *Cadernos de Política Exterior*, v.3, p.45-64, 2016.

Complementary readings:

CANTO, O. A. M. (Ed.) *O Modelo ABACC: Um Marco no Desenvolvimento das Relações entre Brasil e Argentina*. Santa Maria: Editora UFSM, 2016.

KASSENOVA, T. External perceptions of Brazil's nuclear policy: views from Argentina and the United States. *Nonproliferation Review*, v.23, n.5-6, p.595-615, 2016.

MALLEA, R; SPEKTOR, M.; WHEELER, N.J. *The Origins of Nuclear Cooperation: a Critical Oral History between Argentina and Brazil*. Rio de Janeiro/Washington D.C.: FGV/Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2015.

Trip to Aramar Experimental Center (CTMSP), in Iperó (SP)
Friday, July 5, 7:30am-3 pm (to be confirmed)

“Brazilian Nuclear Diplomacy in an Evolving Nuclear Order” - A conversation with Marcelo Câmara
Saturday, Jul 6, 9am-10:30am

- TNP Three Pillars and NPT Rev Com.
- Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and disarmament
- North-South Divide
- TPNW, humanitarian path, and the road ahead

Lecture 9: Social experiments and Brazilian nuclear politics (Matias Spektor, Guilherme Fasolin, and Lucas Perez Florentino)
Saturday, July 6, 10:30am-11:30am

- Nuclear survey experiments in Brazil

(No assigned readings)

Roundtable: “Careers in Global Nuclear Politics” with Sonia Fernández Moreno and Togzhan Kassenova
Saturday, July 6, 11:30am-1pm

Closing Remarks (Matias Spektor)
Saturday, July 6, 1pm-1:30pm